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ABSTRACT
Performance- based financing (PBF) is a mechanism to 
improve the quality and the utilisation of health benefit 
packages. There is a dearth of economic evaluations of 
PBF in the ‘real world’. Afghanistan implemented PBF 
between 2010 and 2015 and evaluated the programme 
using a pragmatic cluster- randomised control trial. We 
conducted a cost- effectiveness analysis of the PBF 
programme in Afghanistan, compared with the standard 
of care, from the provider payer’s perspective. The 
incremental cost- effectiveness ratio of PBF compared with 
the standard of care was US$1242 per disability- adjusted 
life year averted; not cost- effective when compared 
with an opportunity cost threshold of US$349. Incentive 
payments were the main contributor to PBF financial 
cost (70%) followed by data verification (23%), staff time 
(5%) and administration (2%). The unit cost per case of 
antenatal care (ANC), skilled birth attendance (SBA) and 
postnatal care (PNC) services in the standard of care was 
US$0.96 (95% CI 0.92–1.0), US$4.8 (95% CI 4.1–6.3) and 
US$1.3 (95% CI 1.2–1.4), respectively, whereas the cost 
of ANC, SBA and PNC services per case in PBF areas were 
US$4.72 (95% CI 4.68–5.7), US$48.5 (95% CI 48.0–52.5) 
and US$5.4 (95% CI 5.1–5.9), respectively. To conclude, 
our study found that PBF, as implemented in the Afghan 
context, was not the best use of funds to strengthen 
the delivery of maternal and child health services. The 
cost- effectiveness of alternative PBF designs needs to 
be appraised before using PBF at scale to support health 
benefit packages. PBF needs to be considered in the 
context of funding the range of constraints that inhibit 
health service performance improvement.
INTRODUCTION
Performance- based financing (PBF) has 
received considerable policy attention in 
recent years in low- income and middle- 
income countries (LMICs), as a means to 
improve health system performance as part 
of Universal Health Coverage.1 PBF provides 
incentives to service providers (facilities 
and workers) when they achieve predefined 
performance targets.2 A critical concern is 
whether the overall costs of PBF, including 
transaction costs of setting up the payment 
and information systems required, have a 
greater impact than other direct forms of 
funding health services (such as budgets). 
Despite extensive implementation of PBF 
programmes to improve maternal and child 
health (MCH) services, to date, there are only 
two studies of the impact of PBF in LMICs.3 4 
Borghi et al3 found that the PBF programme 
in Tanzania was not cost- effective, whereas 
Zeng et al4 concluded that PBF was a cost- 
effective intervention in Zambia.
The Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) of 
Afghanistan implemented PBF to fund its 
Key questions
What is already known?
 ► In the last decade, there has been extensive invest-
ment in and implementation of performance- based 
financing (PBF) in low- income and middle- income 
countries, specifically post- conflict settings, as an 
approach to expand and improve service delivery.
 ► To date, there have only been two studies reporting 
on the cost- effectiveness of PBF for health services, 
with inconclusive findings.
What are the new findings?
 ► This study found that PBF, as implemented in the 
Afghanistan context, was not the most cost- effective 
use of scarce funds within the health sector budget 
constraint.
What do the new findings imply?
 ► Our research supports the growing evidence high-
lighting the importance of considering efficiency in 
the design of the PBF incentive structure, the capac-
ity at the facility level to respond to incentives and 
the relative importance of services in terms of health 
outcomes.
 ► The success of PBF as a health system strength-
ening strategy ultimately remains dependent on a 
sound understanding of context- specific constraints 
and may require complementary health system 
investments.
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Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) between 2010 
and 2015 aiming to strengthen the performance of MCH 
services. The BPHS provides uniform preventive and 
curative primary health services. The main elements of 
the BPHS are maternal and newborn care, child health 
and immunisation, public nutrition, communicable 
diseases treatment, mental health, disability and phys-
ical rehabilitation services and regular supply of essential 
drugs.5
This study examines the ‘real world’ cost- effectiveness 
of PBF in Afghanistan ex- post, using data from a prag-
matic randomised control trial, using a decision- analytic 
model, that estimates the cost per disability- adjusted 
life year (DALYs) averted. To our knowledge, this is the 
first cost- effectiveness study of PBF in a fragile conflict- 
affected state.
We aim to contribute to the broad evidence base 
informing LMICs on whether PBF can extend and 
improve the performance of health benefits packages in 
a cost- effective way.
METHODS
Study setting
Over the past four decades, Afghanistan has experienced 
political instability, civil war and pervasive conflict.6 A new 
democratic government was established in December 
2001. In 2003, the BPHS was introduced to provide 
primary healthcare services, specifically MCH services, 
to the population. BPHS were contracted to non- state 
providers (NSPs) in 31 provinces, whereas the MoPH 
managed the BPHS in the remaining three provinces 
through direct implementation called Ministry of Public 
Health Strengthening Mechanism (MoPH- SM).7 PBF 
was implemented in nine provinces supported by NSPs 
and two provinces supported by MoPH- SM, covering 463 
BPHS health facilities out of 1892 nationally in 2010.8
Intervention description
PBF provided financial incentives to health workers based 
on the increased production of MCH services (antenatal 
care (ANC), skilled birth attendance (SBA) and postnatal 
care (PNC)) above the baseline for each BPHS health 
facility. These incentives were paid in addition to routine 
salaries and funding of the health facility. Services were 
monitored using data from the Health Management 
Information System (HMIS) and verified through house-
hold visits, comparing reported visits with those noted in 
the health facility registers. If the community validation 
rate exceeded 80%, then the health facility was entitled 
to a performance payment. The payments were weighted 
according to the quality of care assessed by a quarterly 
score on the national monitoring checklist.9 The indica-
tors and level of performance payments are provided in 
the online supplemental table S3.
PBF was evaluated through a large- scale pragmatic 
cluster randomised trial, details of which are reported 
elsewhere.5 All facilities within each province were 
stratified by type of facility and then matched based on 
the outpatient utilisation rate. Within each matched pair, 
health facilities were randomly assigned to control and 
treatment groups. The treatment group received PBF in 
addition to routine funding, whereas the control group 
received only their routine salaries.9 The evaluation of 
PBF involved two household surveys conducted at base-
line in 2010 and end- line in 2015 in the catchment area 
of a sample of treatment and control health facilities. The 
impact evaluation found that, on average, PBF improved 
the utilisation of services in all the payment triggering 
indicators; however, no statistically significant differences 
were found between study arms. In addition, there was 
an overall performance score, which was an average of 
the scores on the 20 indicators from five domains, which 
were client and community, human resources, physical 
capacity, service provision and management systems. 
Each indicator was given equal weighting to develop the 
composite score that ranged from 0 to 100. Facilities 
exposed to PBF achieved a statistically higher index score 
compared with the control group on quality of care.10
Economic evaluation framework
We compared the PBF ‘treatment’ with the standard 
of care ‘control’ for the population of Afghanistan, 
assessing cost- effectiveness using incremental cost per 
DALYs averted. We used a time horizon of 1 year from 
the start of pregnancy for a hypothetical cohort of women 
attending BPHS in Afghanistan between 2010 and 2015. 
We used a decision tree model to estimate DALYs averted 
by PBF for both mothers and neonates as the trial 
reported intermediate health outcomes (ANC, SBA and 
PNC). We parameterised the model with primary cost 
data, service data from the trial and secondary data. We 
assessed cost- effectiveness from a provider perspective 
(MoPH, donor), as data on patient incurred costs were 
not available.
Model design
We adapted a validated model called the ‘Maternal 
Health Policy Model’ to evaluate the costs and health 
outcomes of the PBF intervention in Afghanistan (online 
supplemental figure S2). This model simulates the 
natural history, events and service utilisation related to 
pregnancy and childbirth, including ANC, delivery, abor-
tion, complications and PNC.11 Adapting this model, we 
developed two decision trees, one for pregnant mothers 
and one for newborns, to predict incremental costs and 
health outcomes (online supplemental figure S3). The 
decision trees were parameterised on the probability 
of care- seeking and events occurring and associated 
costs collected during the trial. Within the maternal 
decision tree, pregnant women have the option to use 
or not use ANC services, to proceed to delivery with or 
without a skilled birth attendant or have an abortion, to 
incur potential complications of pregnancy (ie, haemor-
rhage, obstructed labour, sepsis, hypertensive disorders, 
fistula, anaemia and infertility) and to use or not use 
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PNC services. In the neonatal decision tree, newborns 
may receive PNC and may develop complications (ie, low 
birth weight, neonatal sepsis and birth asphyxia).
Cost parameter estimation
Estimating the cost of implementing the PBF intervention
We estimated the financial and economic costs of imple-
menting PBF, using primary cost data from Afghanistan. 
Financial costs included the PBF managers’ salary, incen-
tive payments, data verification and PBF project admin-
istration cost. Economic cost added the financial cost 
with the opportunity costs of items that were used for 
the purpose of the PBF implementation at the national 
and provincial level by the MoPH and NSPs (shared staff, 
building, equipment and transport costs), but were not 
directly paid for by the PBF scheme. Financial cost data 
were obtained from PBF project accounts and financial 
reports. Where PBF costs were shared with other inter-
ventions and activities, we allocated costs to PBF using a 
variety of allocation factors, further details can be found 
in the online supplemental appendix section on costs. 
The cost of personnel whose salaries were not solely 
funded by the PBF project was allocated based on the 
proportion of their time spent on PBF- related activities. 
For shared building space, we allocated according to the 
percentage of floor space used for the PBF intervention. 
The cost of transportation was estimated based on the 
consumption of fuel used for the PBF compared with 
other activities. As the MoPH owned buildings, we used 
estimates of rent of equivalent building spaces to deter-
mine building prices. All (non- building) capital costs 
were annuitised using a 3% discount rate and life span 
of 5 years.
Estimating the unit cost of providing services incentivised by PBF
We estimated the financial costs of the services supported 
by PBF and those in the standard of care. We estimate the 
unit costs of services. We therefore first estimated unit 
costs of service delivery in terms of staff time, medical 
supplies, drugs and capital items. We conducted primary 
data collection, using microcosting methods (see the 
online supplemental appendix for more details) in a 
random sample of 25 health facilities from the 463 BPHS 
health facilities where the PBF intervention was imple-
mented to estimate the unit costs of services. These costs, 
minus PBF incentives and support, were used to estimate 
service costs in the standard of care, as we had no access 
to standard care facilities. Unit costs were estimated using 
a micro- costing method including the costs of salaries, 
drugs, equipment and building. Interviews were under-
taken with all staff (206) at sampled health facilities to 
determine the proportion of staff time spent on each 
service and the proportional use of equipment for each 
service. The percentage of floor space used for each 
service was measured. The average costs of drugs and 
supplies used were calculated using the list of prescribed 
medicine for each service and the pharmacy register 
book at each of the health facilities.
Estimating incremental costs of the PBF
The total cost of services was estimated in the decision- 
analytic model by adding the unit cost for each of the 
services (for PBF including PBF costs) received by the 
cohort in the decision- analytic model. Prices in local 
currency were converted to US dollars to allow compari-
sons between countries (US$1 to 58 Afghani in 2015). We 
used secondary data from the literature to estimate unit 
costs of maternal and newborn- related complications.11 
All costs were inflated and adjusted to 2015 US dollars.
Service utilisation and outcomes
Given the PBF impact evaluation shows an increase in 
the utilisation of services and significant improvement 
in the quality of care in the PBF intervention (treat-
ment) compared with the standard of care (control); 
we used utilisation rates of ANC, SBA and PNC services 
derived from the PBF impact evaluation10 to estimate the 
relative effect of PBF intervention on the utilisation of 
these services. We also sourced other data from the liter-
ature.11–15All parameters used in the decision- analytic 
model are presented in table 1.
We estimated the incremental cost- effectiveness ratio 
(ICER) defined as the incremental cost of PBF per DALY 
averted compared with the standard of care. The ICER 
was assessed against the US$349 per capita threshold esti-
mated by Wood et al’s for Afghanistan,16 that is higher 
than 0.5 of gross domestic product per capita in 2015 
(US$570), as no more recent estimates were available. 
Given that 1 DALY averted equals 1 year of healthy life 
lived, we translated the total number of DALYs averted by 
the intervention to an annual reduction in maternal and 
neonatal deaths. We used a 3% discount rate on cost and 
DALYs averted in our primary analysis. We undertook 
a series of one- way sensitivity analysis across key model 
parameters varying each parameter at a time up to ±30% 
of the base case value. In addition, we used probabilistic 
sensitivity analysis (Monte Carlo situation of 1000 times) 
to assess parameter uncertainty and produce a 95% CI 
around the ICER.
Patient and public involvement
Patient and the public were not involved in the design 
and other stages of this study. However, we plan to dissem-
inate the findings through publication and presentations 
in conferences and public events.
RESULTS
The total incremental financial and economic provider 
costs of the PBF programme were US$10 677 465 and 
US$11 896 380, respectively, during the 6- year life of the 
scheme, as shown in table 2. Incentive payments were the 
main contributor to economic costs (63%) followed by 
HMIS data verification (21%), administration (10%) and 
staff time (6%). The online supplemental table S4 shows 
the PBF annual financial programme cost and the online 
supplemental table S5 presents the annual breakdown of 
the administration costs.
4 Salehi AS, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e002381. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002381
BMJ Global Health
Table 1 Model parameters
Parameter Value Lower Upper Distribution Source
Maternal mortality rate per 100 000 live birth* 396 396 396   24
Neonatal mortality rate per 1000 live birth* 22.00 18.70 25.68   25
Life expectancy at birth* 64.20 64.20 64.20   26
Life expectancy at age 30–34* 41.00 41.00 41.00   26
Average age of pregnant women (years)* 32.00 32.00 32.00   26
Pregnant population in PBF provinces* 79 504 77 388 81 619   25
ANC rate, control group 0.50 0.50 0.50 Beta 10
SBA rate, control group 0.50 0.50 0.50 Beta 10
PNC rate, control group 0.50 0.50 0.50 Beta 10
ANC rate, treatment group 0.60 0.52 0.68 Beta 10
SBA rate, treatment group 0.52 0.50 0.54 Beta 10
PNC rate, treatment group 0.55 0.51 0.60 Beta 10
Unit cost of ANC, control group 0.96 0.92 1.00 Gamma Primary data
Unit cost of delivery with SBA, control group 4.76 2.69 4.08 Gamma Primary data
Unit cost of PNC, control group 1.28 1.19 1.45 Gamma Primary data
Unit cost of ANC, treatment group 4.72 4.7 5.7 Gamma Primary data
Unit cost of delivery with SBA, treatment group 48.48 48.0 52.5 Gamma Primary data
Unit cost of PNC, treatment group 5.38 5.1 5.9 Gamma Primary data
Management of maternal haemorrhage cost* 0.11 0.05 0.23 Gamma 11
Management of obstructed labour cost* 69.33 34.67 173.33 Gamma 11
Treatment of maternal sepsis cost* 37.46 18.73 93.64 Gamma 11
Management of hypertensive disorders Cost* 57.31 28.65 143.28 Gamma 11
Management of abortion cost* 45.98 31.54 79.42 Gamma 11
Safe abortion cost* 31.96 15.98 47.94 Gamma 11
Management of unsafe abortion cost* 60.00 30.00 90.00 Gamma 11
Management of low birth cost* 8.91 6.40 8.67 Gamma 11
Management of sepsis cost 21.31 18.20 22.83 Gamma 11
Management of birth asphyxia cost* 6.34 7.65 5.57 Gamma 11
Haemorrhage incidence* 0.11 0.05 0.23 Beta 11
Hypertensive disorder incidence* 0.03 0.01 0.05 Beta 11
Abortion incidence* 0.105 0.084 0.096 Beta 27
Unsafe abortion incidence* 0.04 0.02 0.10 Beta 11
Obstructed labour incidence* 0.06 0.03 0.07 Beta 11
Severe anaemia incidence* 0.09 0.08 0.09 Beta 11
Maternal sepsis incidence* 0.05 0.04 0.06 Beta 11
Fistula incidence* 0.02 0.02 0.04 Beta 11
infertility incidence* 0.09 0.08 0.09 Beta 11
Low birthweight incidence* 0.17 0.12 0.05 Beta 26
Neonatal sepsis/infection incidence* 0.02 0.02 0.01 Beta 14
Birth asphyxia incidence* 0.03 0.02 0.01 Beta 14
Obstructed labour/fistula duration* 32.0 28.0 36.0   Expert Opinion
Maternal haemorrhage/severe anaemia duration* 0.50 0.50 0.50   Expert opinion
Maternal sepsis/infertility duration* 17.00 17.00 17.00   Expert opinion
Low birthweight duration* 0.06 0.04 0.08   Expert opinion
Neonatal sepsis/all infection duration* 0.04 0.02 0.06   Expert opinion
Continued
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Table 3 presents the average annual health facility cost 
of providing ANC, SBA and PNC services in the PBF and 
control areas. The average annual costs for PBF facilities 
of providing ANC, SBA and PNC services were US$20 607 
(95% CI 14 359–26,818) compared with US$2168 (95% 
CI 2073–2438) in control facilities. Table 4 shows the unit 
cost of services in the PBF and control groups. The esti-
mated unit costs per case receiving ANC, SBA and PNC 
services in the control group were US$0.96 (95% CI 
0.92–1.0), US$4.76 (95% CI 4.1–6.3) and US$1.3 (95% 
CI 1.2–1.4), respectively, whereas the costs of ANC, SBA 
and PNC services per case in the treatment group were 
US$4.72 (95% CI 3.6–5.8), US$48.5 (95% CI 48.0–52.5) 
and US$5.4 (95% CI 5.1–5.9), respectively. The costs of 
incentives and data verification were the main driver for 
the higher unit costs in the PBF facilities. The annual 
per capita cost of the PBF programme was US$0.4 (95% 
CI 0.2–0.6) in the study areas as presented in the online 
supplemental table S6.
The incremental cost of the PBF programme per DALY 
averted was US$1241 (table 5). The probabilistic sensi-
tivity analysis at US$1228 (95% CI 1118–1337) found 
that 0% of simulations the ICER lay below the opportu-
nity cost threshold (not cost- effective). In total, 13 028 
incremental DALYs (5658 incremental maternal DALYs 
and 7370 incremental neonatal DALYs) were averted 
that corresponds to an incremental 253 deaths averted 
(138 maternal and 115 neonatal) between 2010 and 2015 
(equivalent to an annual reduction in maternal mortality 
of 29 deaths per 100 000 live births and neonatal 
mortality of 0.24 deaths per 1000 live births), across the 
11 provinces of Afghanistan, with a total population of 
4.06 million living in the coverage area of PBF facilities. 
Figure 1 presents the PBF cost- effectiveness acceptability 
curve, figure 2 the cost- effectiveness plane and online 
supplemental tables S7 and S8 show the results of one- 
way and two- way sensitivity analyses.
DISCUSSION
The focus on maternal and neonatal health during preg-
nancy, childbirth and postpartum period is proved to be 
effective in reducing maternal and neonatal morbidity 
and mortality.17 18 Afghanistan implemented a PBF 
intervention on a large scale aiming to improve MCH 
services. The PBF intervention was evaluated through 
a pragmatic cluster randomised trial. We developed a 
decision- analytic model of the care pathways, cost and 
outcomes for pregnant women and newborns to estimate 
the incremental cost- effectiveness of the PBF scheme 
relative to the standard of care. Although the PBF inter-
vention resulted in an improvement in the quality of 
MCH services in the PBF group, our study found that 
this initiative was unlikely to be cost- effective from a 
provider payer’s perspective. The finding supports the 
study from Tanzania that the PBF intervention was not 
cost- effective (which did not measure DALYs averted), 
despite improvements in utilisation rates,3 but our study 
Parameter Value Lower Upper Distribution Source
Birth asphyxia duration* 0.19 0.01 0.04   Expert opinion
Maternal haemorrhage/severe anaemia disability weight* 0.093 0.090 0.093   28
Obstructed labour/fistula disability weight* 0.43 0.43 0.43   28
Maternal sepsis/infertility disability weight* 0.18 0.18 0.18   28
Low birthweight disability weight* 0.11 0.11 0.11   28
Neonatal sepsis/infection disability weight* 0.62 0.62 0.62   28
Birth asphyxia disability weight* 0.37 0.34 0.38   28
Quality Index Score, control group 54.9 53.5 56.3   10
Quality Index Score, treatment group 56.7 55.4 58.0   10
*The same parameter is used for both control and treatment groups.
ANC, antenatal care; PBF, performance- based financing; PNC, postnatal care; SBA, skilled birth attendance.
Table 1 Continued
Table 2 The cost of implementing the PBF programme over a 6- year period (US$ 2015)
Cost centre Financial cost Percentage Economic cost Percentage
Salary 522 957 5 772 118 6
Incentives 7 481 266 70 7 481 266 63
Verification 2 475 952 23 2 475 952 21
Administration 197 290 2 1 167 043 10
Total (US$) 10 677 465 100 11 896 380 100
PBF, performance- based financing.
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finding contradicts the only previous robust study from 
Zambia in which the PBF intervention was found to be 
cost- effective.4
Our study found that the costs of implementing PBF 
were substantial compared with those in the non- PBF 
control districts. PBF cost was primarily driven by the 
payment of incentives and data verification linked to 
incentive payment (together accounting for 93% of the 
total financial cost and 84% of the total economic cost). 
The proportion of incentives contrasts with Zambia 
and Tanzania. In Zambia, incentives and verification 
accounted for around 50% of the total cost.4 Borghi et 
al19 reported a high administration cost (financial 63% 
and economic 78%) in Tanzania when implementing a 
PBF intervention.
There are a number of possible explanations for the 
lack of cost- effectiveness of PBF to support the basic 
package for MCH services in Afghanistan. First, the theory 
of change that supported the design of PBF in Afghani-
stan posited that high levels of financial incentives would 
motivate healthcare workers to improve the quality of care 
and subsequently increase demand for MCH services.5 
Although incentives may influence providers, availability 
of resources such as sufficient healthcare workers, equip-
ment, essential drugs and supplies, and effective referral 
systems are essential to ensure the quality provision of 
services.20 However, neither the PBF programme was 
able to overcome these systemic resource constraints, nor 
the health facilities had financial autonomy to procure 
them locally.21 In Zambia, health workers had significant 
autonomy in addressing the shortage of essential inputs 
in health facilities.4
Second, the level of incentive is critical to PBF effi-
ciency.22 When too low, an incentive might fail to 
result in behaviour change, whereas when too high, 
an incentive consumes resources unnecessarily. In 
Afghanistan’s PBF scheme, the incentive payment 
for delivery with SBA was set at US$37 per case. In 
contrast, the incentives for ANC and PNC were set 
much lower, at US$2.8 per case. The SBA incentive 
made 72% of the overall cost of the PBF incentives, 
and it consumed 51% of the PBF total financial cost, 
whereas the ANC and PNC incentives constituted 
only 17% and 9% of the PBF total financial cost. 
Although the substantial effect of SBA on proper 
management of delivery and prevention of pregnancy 
complications is critical, both ANC and PNC are also 
important. ANC has a positive effect on the identifi-
cation of pre- eclampsia/eclampsia and prevention of 
anaemia,23 and PNC plays a crucial role in early iden-
tification and appropriate referral of maternal and 
newborn complications, family planning and promo-
tion of healthy behaviours for mother and newborn. 
Both are designed to encourage a sustained relation-
ship between health services and the mother during 
pregnancy. It is also important to note that 66% of 
global maternal mortality happens in the postpartum 
period, and the first 24 hours after delivery is crucial 
given 45% of deaths occur in this time.17 Therefore, 
although the incentives set may have reflected a level 
of workload, it is essential to also consider the value 
of services in terms of their contribution to health 
outcomes, and not comparatively disincentivise those 
services with low or no additional payments.
Table 3 Average cost of PBF indicators in control and treatment groups per health facility per year (US$ 2015)
Cost centres
ANC cost (US$) SBA cost (US$) PNC cost (US$) Cost per HF (US$)
Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment
Salary 607 867 460 658 419 598 1486 2123
Incentive 0 4345 0 10 170 0 2353 0 16 868
Data verification 0 214 0 214 0 214 0 642
Building 150 214 243 348 108 154 501 716
Equipment 32 46 44 63 25 36 101 145
Drug 22 32 15 22 12 17 49 71
Transport 0.8 1.2 29 41 0 0 30 43
Cost per health facility 812 5719 792 11 515 564 3373 2168 20 607
ANC, antenatal care; PBF, performance- based financing; PNC, postnatal care; SBA, skilled birth attendance.
Table 4 The unit cost of delivering selected maternal and neonatal health services for facilities in control and treatment 
groups (US$ 2015)
Services Control Treatment
Antenatal care US$0.96 (95% CI 0.6–1.5) US$4.7 (95% CI 3.6–5.8)
Skilled birth attendance US$4.8 (95% CI 4.1–6.3) US$48.0 (95% CI 31.0–67.8)
Postnatal care US$1.3 (95% CI 0.8–2.1) US$5.4 (95% CI 4.3–6.5)
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Third, even though HMIS data verification is a crucial 
element of PBF interventions, this ‘transaction cost’ 
can be relatively high. In our case, the verification was 
23% of the total financial cost and 21% of the overall 
economic cost of the PBF intervention in Afghanistan. 
This cost could be reduced by testing different modal-
ities. For example, Zambia replaced the monthly veri-
fication of all health facilities with a risk- based model 
in which health facilities were assessed based on the 
expected risk of misrepresenting data.4
Our study has some limitations. The main limitation 
is that we had to estimate health service costs in the 
non- PBF sites, using micro- costing from the PBF sites. 
This was done based on the assumption that underlying 
service costs and expenditures from other sources would 
be balanced between intervention and control sites due 
to the randomised design and similar funding to all sites 
from other funders (including government payment 
of staff salaries). Although there may have been some 
fungibility at the facility level away from MCH services 
in PBF sites, biasing our PDF site upwards, this will 
have been minimal and only apply to non- salary items. 
Further, the PBF impact evaluation shows that NSPs, 
in implementing the PBF programme, demonstrated 
different capacities that might have affected both cost 
and effectiveness. However, aside from the control 
design, we did not have additional data to explore the 
impact of these differences on cost- effectiveness. On 
the effect side, there may have been a spillover effect 
from the PBF group into the control group due to the 
location of both facilities in the same province and the 
movement of staff and the population across facilities. 
Control health facilities were likely aware of PBF and 
tried to compete with treatment health facilities on 
performance. An additional limitation is that the esti-
mation of staff time spent on each service and propor-
tional use of equipment for each service was based on 
self- reported interviews with health facility staff that 
may be prone to bias. We also had to source some 
data regarding maternal and neonatal- related compli-
cations from outside the study.11–15 These parameter 
limitations were addressed by applying a wide- range 
sensitivity analysis.
To conclude, our study found that PBF, as imple-
mented in the Afghan context, was not the best use 
of funds to strengthen the delivery of MCH services. 
It is likely that the amounts provided were too low 
for some services, there was insufficient flexibility in 
using those resources to address service performance 
constraints and data verification was not economi-
cally efficient. Further research into the efficiency and 
Table 5 Annual costs and outcomes for mothers and 
newborns in PBF and control areas and the incremental 
cost- effectiveness of the PBF programme (US$ 2015)
Mother Newborn Total
Standard of care (control) 
group
Annual cost per person 
(US$) [1]
9.87 2.12 12.32
Annual DALYs averted [2] 0.18 1.07 1.25
PBF treatment group
Annual cost per person 
(US$) [3]
34.51 11.39 45.77
Annual DALYs averted [4] 0.2 1.08 1.28
Incremental cost (US$) 
[3-1]
24.64 9.27 33.91
Incremental DALY averted 
[4-2]
0.012 0.015 0.027
ICER (US$) 2,077 599.8 1,241
DALY, disability- adjusted life years; ICER, incremental cost- 
effectiveness ratio ; PBF, performance- based financing.
Figure 1 PBF cost- effectiveness acceptability curve. GDP, gross domestic product; PBF, performance- basedfinancing; WTP, 
willingness to pay.
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cost- effectiveness of PBF schemes with different designs 
in different settings is important to ensure that PBF 
improves performance and inform how best to strate-
gically purchase health benefit packages in LMICs in 
order to make progress towards UHC.
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